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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TEACHING CRIMINAL LAW IN THE POST-9/11 WORLD: IF
EVERYTHING HAS CHANGED, SO MUST WE

DAVID A. HARRIS*

I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on our country on September 11,
2001, we quickly became accustomed to hearing that the terrifying events of
that day “changed everything.” This phrase was repeated so often that it
quickly took on the aura of a sacred cliché—something every public figure,
every news anchor, and every journalist said constantly, and something that no
one dared challenge. Looking back on that period from the vantage point of
several years later, we can see that in some ways this assessment was
overblown. Clearly, not everything had changed. Our country still had its own
internal issues to deal with: education, taxes, and campaign finance reform, to
name just a few. And, except for a regrettably short period of bipartisan unity
in the wake of the attacks, our ideological and political divisions have
remained as strong as they have ever been.
Nevertheless, for lawyers, and especially for teachers in law schools, some
very important things have indeed changed. Those of us who make our livings
parsing legal texts and publishing our solutions to legal problems in law
reviews and the mainstream press know that when a society experiences great
stress, the law comes under great pressure—especially in the areas of law that
involve confrontations between government power and the individual. In such
times, the Constitution and the criminal law are always severely tested.
Surveying the first thirty months after the events of September 2001, that is
exactly what we see. Grand, macro-scale questions have come into focus. For
example, when, if ever, is it possible or proper for the United States
government to hold a U.S. citizen in custody without laying any charges,
without access to counsel, without trial—indeed, without any of the safeguards
that we have come to associate with the rights of the accused who are in the
custody of the state?1 In what circumstances may the U.S. government hold

* Eugene Balk Professor of Law and Values, University of Toledo College of Law.
1. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), reh’g and reh’g en banc
denied, 337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003), and cert. granted, 124 S.Ct. 981 (Jan. 9, 2004) (No. 031249
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persons in custody, but refuse to release any information identifying them?2
Thus, teachers of both Constitutional Law and Criminal Law must ask an
important question: How should they change what they teach in light of these
new realities?
With regard to Constitutional Law, the answers fairly jump out. If the
Supreme Court decides that an American citizen can be detained as an “enemy
combatant” when he has been captured on the battlefield, and then held
without any of the rights we associate with government custody of the accused,
the constitutional issues are both clear and substantial. They involve the
separation of powers, the extent of the President’s power as head of the
Executive Branch and as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and the
proper limitations on the role of the judiciary in such a situation. These issues
and the questions they present would not, by any stretch, be easy to resolve,
but the constitutional categories they fall into, and the issues that they affect,
would be fairly obvious.
The issues would also be easy to spot in the area of law we call criminal
procedure. Indeed, some law schools refer to the course on this area of law as
Constitutional Criminal Procedure. The material and the issues in this course
concern the constitutional regulation of law enforcement: when police may
stop, search, and seize an individual (governed by the Fourth Amendment);
when the police may question someone (governed by the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments); and when an individual is entitled to the assistance of counsel
(governed by the Sixth Amendment). In short, criminal procedure is
constitutional law.
Yet in the area of substantive criminal law, the issues are not so
immediately clear. We know that, in the very recent past, when terrorists have
struck, they have been apprehended under the criminal law in United States
courts.3 Thus, the criminal law has been our primary tool in asserting the
values of our society and protecting our citizens against the likes of Timothy
McVeigh, who destroyed the federal building in Oklahoma City in a terrorist
bombing, and Sheik Abdel Rahman and his followers, the terrorists who
carried out the first attack against the World Trade Center in New York City in
1993. How, then, should the teacher of Criminal Law approach this important
subject in the post-9/11 world?

6696); see also Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S.Ct. 1168
(U.S. Jan. 23, 2004) (No. 03-1027).
2. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 124 S.Ct. 1041 (Jan. 12, 2004) (No. 03-472).
3. See, e.g., U.S. v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999) (defendants charged with
conspiracy to, among other things, bomb the World Trade Center); U.S. v. Salameh, 261 F.3d 271
(2d Cir. 2001) (appeals of convictions and sentencing surrounding the February 1993 bombing of
the World Trade Center in New York City).
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For me, the answer has been both simple and complex, daunting and
inviting: include the post-9/11 realities in teaching Criminal Law any way you
can. No, it does not always fit the material neatly; the issues aren’t as obvious
as in the Criminal Procedure course. But, like it or not, our students will begin
practice in a legal world fundamentally changed by what happened on
September 11, 2001, and I believe it is our obligation to bring this home to
them at every possible juncture that makes sense. They need to see that the
changes that are happening in real time in the society and the legal culture all
around them will have an enormous impact on the way that many of them will
practice law and the way that all Americans understand what law is. They
simply cannot leave law school with the belief that these changes have nothing
to do with them—that if they are not immigrants or Arabs or Middle Easterners
or Muslims, they need not be concerned. To allow them to leave our
classrooms thinking this way would do them an enormous disservice. On the
contrary, it is the duty of the legal profession to attempt to mediate the tensions
that have arisen in our society since 9/11. Finding the balance we must seek
between the safety of citizens and the protection of the defendant and the
countermajoritarian values in the Bill of Rights is never easy, not even in the
safest of times. It is made much less so by the existence of a real and
dangerous threat: the undeterrable terrorist, whose desire to kill us is greater
than his own desire to live. It is a challenge unlike any other we have faced.
But, if we are to preserve what is best about our country and our society, we
must make sure that we as citizens and as lawyers have a keen sense of what is
at stake and teach this to our students so that they can understand and embrace
the core values of our profession in everything they do.
Some will say that there is a danger that one can go too far in this
direction—that a law school instructor might talk about post-9/11
developments in criminal law simply for the sake of talking about them.
Surely, this is possible, but I believe the risks are actually rather low as long as
one is reasonably selective. First, there is little doubt that, along with
immigration law, criminal law is indeed proving to be one of the major
weapons in the government’s arsenal as it attempts to fight terrorists. In other
words, there is no need to make up the connection between the war on terror
and criminal law. It is real, and examples abound. The important thing is to
select examples carefully, so that the connections to particular issues under
study are clear enough for students to see. Second, one can argue persuasively
that the danger of overemphasis simply does not exist. For any lawyer whose
practice sometimes involves any kind of public law (as opposed to matters
strictly between private parties), the war on terror and its effects on our legal
system will be a fact of life for many years to come. Witness the many
changes that have already taken place in the legal system in the first two years
after 9/11. The war on terror is likely to be the single largest influence in the
development of public law in the United States over the next forty to fifty
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years—that is, over the course of the entire career of law students who
graduate in the next ten years. Thus, it seems that the benefits of covering
some of this material in Criminal Law far outweigh the risks involved.
Of course, it is possible to cover these issues more directly than by just
raising them occasionally in Criminal Law. For example, for some years I
have taught Advanced Criminal Procedure. I run the course on two parallel
tracks. The first track consists of an in-depth study of many of the issues that
we only touch on in the basic Criminal Procedure course. We do this by
reading cutting-edge theoretical and empirical work. For example, in the basic
Criminal Procedure course, our discussions often include some speculation
concerning the actual deterrence value of the Fourth Amendment’s
exclusionary rule. In Advanced Criminal Procedure, we read the empirical
studies and explorations of alternatives. What evidence is there that the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule actually deters police misconduct?4 What other
rules might we design that might work better to accomplish this purpose?
Would we actually be better off without the Miranda rules, as some contend?5
Should we videotape all statements suspects make to the police instead of
administering Miranda warnings,6 or should we videotape statements in
addition to using the Miranda rules?7 Or, should we bar police interrogation
altogether and leave the questioning of suspects to judges?8 The second track
of the course parallels the first by allowing students to apply this knowledge
practically and build their forensic skills by briefing and arguing two different
criminal procedure problems that incorporate the issues we have studied. This
gives students a chance to become better oral advocates and writers, as they
bring their new knowledge of the subject matter to bear.
As I prepared to teach Advanced Criminal Procedure in the fall of 2002, I
was struck by the fact that the issues at the forefront of the field of criminal
procedure no longer concerned the exclusionary rule or the Miranda warnings.
These issues were clearly still important, but everyone I knew with strong
interests in criminal procedure was now talking about other things, such as the
USA Patriot Act, the possible use of military tribunals, the strengthening of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court, and the detention of large
numbers of people without identifying them, to name just a few. Thinking

4. E.g., Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About
the “Costs” of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of “Lost” Arrests, 1983
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611 (1983).
5. See Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L.
REV. 387, 486-97 (1996).
6. Id.
7. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly
Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 556-60 (1996).
8. Donald A. Dripps, Supreme Court Review—Foreword: Against Police Interrogation—
And the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699 (1988).
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about this, I decided to make a wholesale change in what Advanced Criminal
Procedure would cover. I preserved the two-track structure of the course, but
replaced all of the material focusing on Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment
with the basic texts of the war on terror. For example, students would read,
among many other items, the USA Patriot Act,9 the presidential10 and
Department of Defense11 orders on military tribunals, and the memorandum of
the Deputy Attorney General ordering the “voluntary” questioning of 5,000
young Middle Eastern men in late 2001 and early 2002.12 The forensic track of
the course was changed, too: students did briefs and arguments challenging
and defending particular sections of the USA Patriot Act.
The students were enthusiastic about the changes. In post-course
evaluations, they praised the opportunity to study items that were both relevant
to their educations and constantly in the news, and they were very happy to
have the chance to sharpen their forensic skills on the most important antiterror statute passed thus far. Indeed, the one negative aspect of the experience
was borne primarily by me. With a course so attuned to current legal events,
the issues could sometimes become a moving target. Issues that seemed likely
to be important before the beginning of the course, at the time that I put the
course materials together for the students, would sometimes recede in
importance by the time the course was under way. For example, in preparing
to teach the course in the fall of 2003, I included in the materials draft
legislation then popularly known as “Patriot Act II.”13 This bill was meant to
strengthen the USA Patriot Act and broaden its reach. By the time the class
reached the point in the course in which this material would have been
appropriate, it had become fairly clear that the proposal was dead; the Bush
Administration did not even try to introduce it in Congress. A second example
of the “moving target” phenomenon concerned material I had to add midway
through the course during the fall of 2003—the designation of U.S. citizens as

9. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272.
10. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,
66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
11. See Fact Sheet: Department of Defense Order on Military Commissions (Mar. 21, 2002),
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321fact.pdf (last visited Sept. 27,
2004).
12. See Office of the Attorney General, Memorandum for All United States Attorneys All
Members of the Anti-Terrorism Task Forces (Nov. 9, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
ag/readingroom/terrorism1.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2004).
13. See Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 (Draft) (Jan. 9, 2003), available at
http://www.poptel.org.uk/statewatch/news/2003/feb/patriot2draft.html (last visited Sept. 27,
2004).
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enemy combatants and the several decisions that had then been made by courts
on the issue.14
But if it is easy to see how to work material on the war against terror into
courses concerning criminal procedure, this leads us back to the initial
question: How should one attempt to teach post-9/11 legal developments in a
first-year Criminal Law course? I offer the following example to explain how
I attempted it.
II. THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMES: UNITED STATES V. SATTAR15
When I teach Criminal Law, I include a short section early in the course on
the elements of crimes for several reasons. First, I do this because Criminal
Law is taught as a required first-year course at my institution. The practical
effect of this is that I use Criminal Law to teach many legal concepts that are
basic to the students’ entire legal education. Second, I can use the material on
elements of crimes generally to teach briefly about certain crimes that bar
examiners seem interested in testing, when those crimes, standing alone, are
simply not interesting enough to justify spending even a small section of the
course discussing. When my students see these offenses in the course of the
bar preparation study or the examination itself, it will not be the first time.
Third and most importantly, certainly for those who may one day practice
criminal law, students simply must understand that the job of the lawyer is to
prove (or cast doubt upon) various facts in contention. Most probably do, but
we err as teachers in assuming that this sinks in automatically for every
student. It pays to help students start the course with an almost mechanical
understanding that lawyers who work as prosecutors must prove the elements
of the offenses charged. To address all three of these concerns, I give the
students a short primer of my own on the elements of crimes—what they are,
constitutional requirements, and the like—and then a number of typical statutes
that they might encounter, followed by a problem set. Each problem spells out
a hypothetical factual scenario. Students are instructed to set out the elements
that must be proven for each crime, and then asked to supply a short answer
explaining which of the defendants might be guilty of one or more of the
particular crimes laid out in the statutes.
For the Spring 2004 Criminal Law class, I followed these materials by
assigning part of a case called United States v. Sattar.16 This case was still in
the throes of pretrial litigation when I assigned it. It concerned a group of

14. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied,
337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S.Ct. 981 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2004) (No. 03-6696); see
also Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S.Ct. 1168 (U.S. Jan.
23, 2004) (No. 03-1027).
15. 272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
16. Id.
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defendants accused of providing help to a foreign terrorist organization. This
opinion, ruling on several of the pretrial motions in the case, contained a
section in which these very serious charges raised an argument in which a
careful analysis of the elements of the crime was absolutely crucial. The case
thus appeared to be a perfect opportunity to tie the lessons of street-level
criminal law to the war on terror. This is how I taught the case to the class.
We began the discussion with a basic exploration of the facts of the case
and the arguments made in it. One of the defendants in the Sattar case, Lynne
Stewart, is a well-known criminal defense attorney in New York City. In
1995, Stewart took on the defense of Sheikh Abdel Rahman.17 Rahman was
one of the principal leaders of the Islamic Group, also known as Gama’a alIslamiyya or Islamic Gama’at (IG).18 IG, which has been designated a foreign
terrorist organization by the Secretary of State,19 has had a presence in the U.S.
since the early 1990s.20 In 1995, Stewart defended Sheikh Rahman on charges
that he was part of a conspiracy to conduct terrorism on American soil,
including the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 and a plot to bomb a
number of other New York City landmarks.21 Stewart continued to represent
Sheikh Rahman throughout his trial, conviction, and sentencing to life in
prison plus sixty-five years, and she continued to meet with him in prison after
he was sentenced.22 Among the allegations against Stewart in the Sattar caseis
that in the course of those meetings, Stewart helped to allow Sheikh Rahman to
communicate with his followers outside the prison by distracting guards while
Rahman both received and sent communications to his followers through one
Yousry—a man that Stewart brought to the prison as an Arabic translator.23
Translator Yousry allegedly passed messages to, and received responses to
these messages from, Sheikh Rahman during prison meetings, all in Arabic.
Stewart helped “cover” for the Sheikh and the translator by speaking in
English to distract the guards. Stewart is also alleged to have passed a message
to the Sheikh’s followers herself when she announced one of the Sheikh’s
positions to the media at a news conference.24 These actions resulted in the
first two counts in the indictment: providing material support to a foreign

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 354.
Id. at 353.
Id.
Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 353.
Id. at 354.
Id.
Id. at 354-55.
Id. at 355.
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terrorist organization, under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, in the form of
“communications equipment” and “personnel.”25
Attorney Stewart and her co-defendant Sattar moved to dismiss Counts I
and II as “unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.”26 In essence, they argued
that the charges that they “provided material support” in the form of
“communications equipment” and “personnel” were too indefinite to provide
ordinary persons with an understanding of what conduct the law prohibits or to
provide sufficient prosecutorial standards to protect against arbitrary and
discriminatory law enforcement.27 The indictment alleged that Stewart and
Sattar and others “provided communications equipment and other physical
assets, including telephones, computers and telefax machines . . . to IG”28 by
acting, essentially as a “communications pipeline” between Sheikh Abdel
Rahman and the outside world.29 For example, the indictment alleged that for
purposes of the uses of communications equipment, Sattar had telephone
conversations with IG leaders in which he passed on to them Sheikh Abdel
Rahman’s instructions, and Stewart released one of Sheikh Abdel Rahman’s
statements to the press.30 As far as providing material support in the form of
“personnel,” the indictment alleged that Sattar, Stewart, and others “provided
personnel, including themselves, to IG, in order to assist IG leaders and
members in the United States and elsewhere around the world, in
communicating with each other . . . .”31 In other words, Stewart and Sattar
were themselves the personnel they provided to IG. In order to examine the
argument that the statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied, the court
moved directly to a consideration of the elements of the crime alleged. The
opinion quoted the pertinent part of the “material support” statute, which said
that “[w]hoever, within the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States, knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign
terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be [guilty].”32
The statute defines “material support or resources” as “currency or other
financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, safehouses, false
documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities,
weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other

25. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 354-55. The other charges in the indictment are not relevant
to the discussion of the elements of the crime, and I do not have students read any other sections
in these cases.
26. Id. at 355.
27. Id. at 356-57.
28. Id. at 356.
29. Id.
30. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 356-57.
31. Id. at 357 (emphasis supplied).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2000).
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physical assets, except medicine or religious materials.”33 Therefore, the court
said, “Section 2339B . . . requires only that a person ‘knowingly’ ‘provides’
‘material support or resources’ to a ‘foreign terrorist organization.’”34 Stewart
and her co-defendant Sattar argued that the indictment charged them “with
merely talking . . . [and] using communications equipment rather than
providing such equipment to IG.”35
When the class discussion had progressed to this point, I could see that the
students understood that unlocking the case had to involve examining the
elements of the crime, followed by performing the same task that any attorney
would when confronted with criminal charges: seek definitions of the key
statutory terms. In Sattar, the students saw that this was exactly what had
happened. Defendants Stewart and Sattar pointed out to the court that the
legislative history produced by the relevant congressional committee in the
course of enacting the “material support” statute indicated that, in fact,
Congress did not intend to criminalize the mere use of communications
equipment; rather, it only criminalized the actual giving of communications
equipment to a foreign terrorist organization like IG.36 Stewart and Sattar thus
argued that simply making phone calls, or talking or communicating one’s
thoughts, did not fall within the statute. The court agreed, holding that
“criminalizing the mere use of phones and other means of communication . . .
provides neither notice nor standards for its application such that it is
unconstitutionally vague as applied.”37
The opinion then focuses on the fact that the government had argued in its
brief opposing the defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts I and II that the
defendants had in fact actively provided members of IG with communications
equipment. This contradicted what the government said in the indictment,
where it had only charged that Sattar and Stewart had used communications
equipment. The court apparently confronted the government with this
contradiction at oral argument, as the opinion notes that “[t]he Government . . .
changed course and stated at oral argument that the mere use of one’s
telephone constitutes criminal behavior under the statute and that, in fact, ‘use
equals provision.’”38 This 180-degree change in direction prompted the court
to come to the only reasonable conclusion: If the government itself were
confused on the theory of its case and how it fit the elements of the statute,

33. Id. § 2339A(b).
34. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 356.
35. Id. at 357.
36. Id. at 357-58. The court also referenced a committee report as evidence of the statute’s
legislative history. See COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, COMPREHENSIVE ANTITERRORISM ACT
OF 1995, H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, at 45 (1995).
37. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 358.
38. Id.
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surely a person of ordinary intelligence would be too; the statute surely was
vague as applied to the charge.
Stewart and Sattar argued next that the statute was unconstitutionally
vague as applied in the context of the “‘provision’ of ‘personnel.’”39 The case
indicates that the government relied on United States v. Lindh,40 the so-called
“American Taliban” case, in which a court stated that the statute covered the
provision of personnel through one’s own employment by a terrorist
organization—in other words, that providing oneself to the organization was
sufficient to constitute providing “personnel.”41 The court in Stewart and
Sattar’s case asserted that, whatever the merits of such a position in a case like
Lindh,42 in which the defendant “provides himself” by literally becoming a
soldier in a terrorist organization’s army,43 this does nothing to overcome the
unconstitutional vagueness of the “provision of personnel” idea in the statute.
The court then concluded that to charge that a defendant has provided a foreign
terrorist organization with herself is particularly troublesome in the context of
an attorney who represents a terrorist, as Stewart did in her representation of
Sheikh Adbel Rahman. Every lawyer is an agent of her client, the court said,
so under the government’s theory, any lawyer who represents someone
charged as a leader of a foreign terrorist organization would always be
providing material support to the terrorist organization.44 Incredibly, just as
with the discussion of the provision of communications equipment, the
government was unable to answer the court’s inquiries at oral argument
concerning its own theories. The government asserted at oral argument that
there might be some difference between a member and a “quasi-employee” of
a foreign terrorist organization for purposes of its “personnel” theory, and the
court asked the government to explain. With an abundance of delicacy, the
court says in its opinion that “the Government initially responded ‘You know it
when you see it.’”45 Of course, this statement recalls Justice Stewart’s famous
“method” for identifying obscenity,46 but the court rightly concluded that it is a
laughable way to explain the application of a powerful federal criminal statute.
It is, the court says, “an insufficient guide by which a person can predict the
legality of that person’s conduct.”47 With a bit more discussion, the court

39. Id.
40. 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002).
41. Id. at 572-73.
42. The court doubts the correctness of this idea, noting that it is not supported any place in
the statute. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 359.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 360.
46. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
47. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 360.
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dismissed Counts I and II of the indictment against Sattar and Stewart as
unconstitutionally vague.
III. THE LESSONS LEARNED
The proof of the efficacy of any teaching is what students actually learn
from it. In a typical large class, an instructor cannot gauge what everyone in
the class has picked up from any one session or block of material, at least in
the absence of an examination question focusing on the particular point. My
discussion with students brought out the following overall points in ways that
were consistent enough that I felt confident that those participating in or
paying attention to the interchanges would have understood them.
First, students understood that the first task of any lawyer working in the
criminal justice process, whether on behalf of the government or the defendant,
is to familiarize oneself with the elements of the charges. This process applies
whether the charges are complex and serious, even newsworthy ones like
providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, or simple charges
seen so much more often (such as theft, which appeared in the initial exercises
I gave the students). They also saw how important it was to obtain a thorough
understanding of the elements through the process of statutory interpretation
and how working with the elements of crimes and using statutory interpretation
were actually intertwining skills.
Second, the exercise of using the Sattar case brought home that the things
we learn in Criminal Law, even very basic skills like understanding what the
elements of crimes are and how to find, interpret, and use them, are neither
purely academic matters nor musty ideas from dusty old pages. They are,
rather, vital tools in the most important cases in our judicial system right this
minute. Likewise, one got the strong sense from the discussion that among the
students who already found Criminal Law interesting, and perhaps especially
among those who did not, they developed a much more pointed understanding
of the vital nature of the material in terms of the most important issues facing
our society.
Third, the class discussion revealed feelings of surprise among the students
that the government seemed to have made some important mistakes in its
advocacy in the case. Some students asked whether, in fact, the government’s
lawyers had indicted the defendants without fully researching or understanding
what the elements of the crime were, or they asked how the allegations in the
indictment dovetailed (or rather, did not dovetail) with the elements. Of
course, I could not answer those questions because I had no direct knowledge,
but I had a rather easy time convincing the students of the importance of
obtaining a strong understanding of the elements of any crime before drafting
an indictment. Having to change one’s theory of the case midstream, as they
saw, was at the least embarrassing, and could even be fatal to the case—an
outcome any lawyer wants to avoid.
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Fourth, the students clearly obtained a new understanding of the
importance of the law, the legal system, and well-honed reasoning and
lawyering skills in the war on terror. They also began to understand the fact
that lawyers—who will inevitably represent those accused of crimes in the war
against terror—will not only suffer the slings and arrows of public opinion but
could also find themselves actually accused of cooperating in the worst
possible crimes against the American people and the United States. In short,
the case was a pointed reminder of the stakes in this struggle. The
government, students saw, is prepared to do whatever is necessary, even sweep
attorneys into its net. I can think of little that could have brought the gravity of
the situation to my students’ attention so directly—and so personally.
IV. CONCLUSION
As a teacher with an abiding interest in criminal law and our Constitution,
and with a deep belief that the stakes for both have never been so high, I plan
to continue to use whatever I can from the war on terror to illustrate important
concepts in criminal law. I have always begun the semester in the class by
telling my students that it is in criminal law that we can see the most basic,
naked confrontations between the awesome power of the government and the
individual. The war on terror and the changes it continues to bring about in
our legal system do not change this. Rather, the war on terror exemplifies and
magnifies the effect. I would urge anyone who teaches the subject to explore
the opportunities for teaching that terrorism cases will bring to a Criminal Law
class.

